Biochemical and nuclear material shipped to Iraq

with U.S. knowledge and via U.S. firms and government

 

To Jon den Herder of Holland, MI, Peacemakers from Elson Boles as a result of a denial from Rep. Peter Hoekstra during a Town Meeting in Holland city hall on January 30, 2003.

Thank you for your message.  Pete Hoekstra doesn’t know what he’s talking about; or he is intentionally playing word games.  Typical for a politician.

I’ve enclosed three full articles from the Congressional Record, the New York Times, and other reputable sources at the end of this message to demonstrate four points:

1.  Yes, the US government approved and orchestrated US corporate sales and exports of components for mustard gas to Iraq.  (But in ARTICLE FOUR below, the author notes “The US Department of Commerce licensed 70 biological exports to Iraq between 1985 and 1989, including at least 21 batches of lethal strains of anthrax.”)  

More important, the US Department of Intelligence, the Department of Agriculture, the National Security Council, the CIA, and others, not only knew that the very purpose of selling the components was for Iraq to make mustard gas, but above all else, the US actively helped Iraq deploy the mustard gas and other agents to kill tens of thousands Iranians. 

Here are three excerpts from ARTICLE ONE (enclosed below) on US helping Iraq deploy chemical weapons, from the New York Times, August 2002: 

“Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly condemned

Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX and other poisonous agents,

the American military officers [interviewed by the New York Times] said

President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national

security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified

program in which more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence

Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian

deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and

bomb-damage assessments for Iraq” 

[with the full knowledge for years that Iraq was using chemical weapons, as this team was conducting weekly battle assessments—Boles]

“The Pentagon’s battle damage assessments confirmed that Iraqi military commanders had integrated chemical weapons throughout their arsenal and were adding them to strike plans that American advisers either prepared or suggested. Iran claimed it suffered thousands of deaths from chemical weapons. The American intelligence officers never encouraged or condoned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, but neither did they oppose it because they [allegedly] considered Iraq to be struggling for its survival, people involved at the time said in interviews.  The Pentagon “wasn’t so horrified by Iraq’s use of gas,” said one veteran of the program. “It was just another way of killing people ? whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn’t make any difference,” he said.”

“Col. Walter P. Lang, retired, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, said he would not discuss classified information, but added that both D.I.A. and C.I.A. officials “were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose” to Iran.  “The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern,” he said. What Mr.  Reagan’s aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  Colonel Lang asserted that the Defense Intelligence Agency “would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle [allegedly] for survival.” Senior Reagan administration officials did nothing to interfere with the continuation of the program, a former participant in the program said.”

2.   As with the components for mustard gas, the US government approved the sale to Iraq of anthrax and other biological materials.  See ARTICLE TWO below, excerpts from the US CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the investigation by Sentor Riegle, which lists the dates and types of lethal anthrax, e coli, and various botulins that the US government approved for sale to Iraq by US corporations.  (And for info on bank scandal behind the US financing of Saddam—the infamous BNL scandal— see these links: http://www.svsu.edu/~boles/index/usarmedIraq.htm)

3.   The CIA directly sold cynide to Iraq, and when the Iraq gassed the Kurds—their “own” people—the US tried to cover it up by blaming Iran. 

A New York Times article, “Revolving-Door Monsters,” (10-11-02) reported

that “when Mr. Cheney was running Halliburton, the oil services firm, it

sold more equipment to Iraq than any other company did. As first

reported by The Financial Times on Nov. 3, 2000, Halliburton subsidiaries submitted $23.8 million worth of contracts with Iraq to the United Nations in 1998 and 1999 for approval by its sanctions committee.”  The article goes on to point out, “More broadly, the U.S.  has a long history in which Saddam, though just as monstrous as he is today, was coddled as our monster.  In the 1980’s we provided his army with satellite intelligence so that it could use chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. When Saddam used nerve gas and mustard gas against Kurds in 1988, the Reagan administration initially tried to blame Iran.  We shipped seven strains of anthrax to Iraq between 1978 and 1988.” 

(For more on why this is all about oil, go to this page http://www.svsu.edu/~boles/111/articles/foroil.htm.and read the Washington Post article, “In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil Is Key Issue, U.S.  Drillers Eye Huge Petroleum Pool”)

4.  Here’s an excerpt from ARTICLE THREE below on equipment to make NUCLEAR WEAPONS that the US government approved:

“In 1982, Reagan “legalized” direct military assistance to Iraq.  This resulted in more than a billion dollars in military related exports.  According to Kenneth R. Timmerman (author of The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq) the US government under Reagan and Bush sold Iraq 60 Hughes MD 500 “Defender” helicopters, eight Bell Textron AB 212 military helicopters equipped for anti-submarine warfare, 48 Bell Textron 214 ST utility helicopters (sold for “recreational” purposes), and US military infra-red sensors and thermal imaging scanners (sold illegally to Iraq through a Dutch company). After the Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency found the following US equipment in Iraq: spectrometers, oscilloscopes, neutron initiators, high-speed switches for nuclear detonation, and other tools used to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons.   “One entire facility, a tungsten-carbide manufacturing plant that was part of the Al Atheer complex,” Timmerman told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “was blown up by the IAEA in April 1992 because it lay at the heart of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program, PC-3. Equipment for this plant appears to have been supplied by the Latrobe, Pennsylvania manufacturer, Kennametal, and by a large number of other American companies, with financing provided by the Atlanta branch of the BNL bank.”

THREE SUPPORTING ARTICLES:

ARTICLE ONE

US Helped Iraq Use Chemical Weapons

Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas

New York Times

August 18, 2002

By PATRICK E. TYLER

WASHINGTON, Aug. 17 ? A covert American program during the Reagan administration provided Iraq with critical battle planning assistance at a time when American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war, according to senior military officers with direct knowledge of the program.

These officers, most of whom agreed to speak on the condition that they not be named, spoke in response to a reporter’s questions about the nature of gas warfare on both sides of the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1981 to 1988. Iraq’s use of gas in that conflict is repeatedly cited by President Bush and, this week, by his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, as justification for “regime change” in Iraq.

The covert program was carried out at a time when President Reagan’s top aides, including Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and Gen. Colin L. Powell, then the national security adviser, were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States decided it was imperative that Iran be thwarted, [allegedly] so it could not overrun the important oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf. It has long been known that the United States provided intelligence assistance to Iraq in the form of satellite photography to help the Iraqis understand how Iranian forces were deployed against them. But the full nature of the program, as described by former Defense Intelligence Agency officers, was not previously disclosed.

Secretary of State Powell, through a spokesman, said the officers’ description of the program was “dead wrong,” but declined to discuss it.  His deputy, Richard L. Armitage, a senior defense official at the time, used an expletive relayed through a spokesman to indicate his denial that the United States acquiesced in the use of chemical weapons.  [Armitage was implicated in the massive cover up by the Reagan administration, the Pentagon, and the State Department of the US downing of an Iranian airliner in 1987 during a secret war against Iran by the US.]

[snip]

Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX and other poisonous agents, the American military officers said President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq [even though they knew that they were aiding Iraq’s use chemical weapons].

Iraq shared its battle plans with the Americans, without admitting the use of chemical weapons, the military officers said. But Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, already established at that point, became more evident in the war’s final phase.

Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in pressing the Reagan administration to offer aid to Iraq out of concern that Iranian commanders were sending waves of young volunteers to overrun Iraqi forces. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, then and now, met with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and then told officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency that Iraq’s military command was ready to accept American aid.

In early 1988, after the Iraqi Army, with American planning assistance, retook the Fao Peninsula in an attack that reopened Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, a defense intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Rick Francona, now retired, was sent to tour the battlefield with Iraqi officers, the American military officers said.

He reported that Iraq had used chemical weapons to cinch its victory, one former D.I.A. official said. Colonel Francona saw zones marked off for chemical contamination, and containers for the drug atropine scattered around, indicating that Iraqi soldiers had taken injections to protect themselves from the effects of gas that might blow back over their positions. (Colonel Francona could not be reached for comment.)

C.I.A. officials supported the program to assist Iraq, though they were not involved. Separately, the C.I.A. provided Iraq with satellite photography of the war front.

Col. Walter P. Lang, retired, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, said he would not discuss classified information, but added that both D.I.A. and C.I.A. officials “were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose” to Iran.

“The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern,” he said. What Mr. Reagan’s aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Colonel Lang asserted that the Defense Intelligence Agency “would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle [allegedly] for survival.” Senior Reagan administration officials did nothing to interfere with the continuation of the program, a former participant in the program said.

Iraq did turn its chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, but the intelligence officers say they were not involved in planning any of the military operations in which these assaults occurred. They said the reason was that there were no major Iranian troop concentrations in the north and the major battles where Iraq’s military command wanted assistance were on the southern war front.

The Pentagon’s battle damage assessments confirmed that Iraqi military commanders had integrated chemical weapons throughout their arsenal and were adding them to strike plans that American advisers either prepared or suggested. Iran claimed it suffered thousands of deaths from chemical weapons.

The American intelligence officers never encouraged or condoned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, but neither did they oppose it because they [allegedly] considered Iraq to be struggling for its survival, people involved at the time said in interviews.

Another former senior D.I.A. official who was an expert on the Iraqi military said the Reagan administration’s treatment of the issue ?  publicly condemning Iraq’s use of gas while privately acquiescing in its employment on the battlefield ? was an example of the [hypocrisy of the] “Realpolitik” of American interests in the war.

The effort on behalf of Iraq “was heavily compartmented,” a former D.I.A. official said, using the military jargon for restricting secrets to those who need to know them.

“Having gone through the 440 days of the hostage crisis in Iran,” he said, “the period when we were the Great Satan, if Iraq had gone down it would have had a catastrophic effect on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the whole region might have gone down ? that was the backdrop of the policy.”

One officer said, “They had gotten better and better” and after a while chemical weapons “were integrated into their fire plan for any large operation, and it became more and more obvious.”

A number of D.I.A. officers who took part in aiding Iraq more than a decade ago when its military was actively using chemical weapons, now say they believe that the United States should overthrow Mr. Hussein at some point. But at the time, they say, they all believed that their covert assistance to Mr. Hussein’s military in the mid-1980’s was a crucial factor in Iraq’s victory in the war and the containment of a far more dangerous threat from Iran.

The Pentagon “wasn’t so horrified by Iraq’s use of gas,” said one veteran of the program. “It was just another way of killing people ?  whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn’t make any difference,” he said.

Former Secretary of State Shultz and Vice President Bush tried to stanch the flow of chemical precursors to Iraq and spoke out against Iraq’s use of chemical arms, but Mr. Shultz, in his memoir, also alluded to the struggle in the administration.

“I was stunned to read an intelligence analysis being circulated within the administration that ‘we have demolished a budding relationship (with Iraq) by taking a tough position in opposition to chemical weapons,’ “ he wrote.

Mr. Shultz also wrote that he quarreled with William J. Casey, then the director of central intelligence, over whether the United States should press for a new chemical weapons ban at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Mr. Shultz declined further comment.

 

ARTICLE TWO

Congressional Record (Senate) February 9, 1994

MR. RIEGLE

U.S. Senator

Chair, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Washington, DC

 

I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleague from Nebraska and my colleague from Hawaii.

Mr. President, I am here today with some very important information with respect to what may be affecting the health of our gulf war veterans, many of whom have come home with terribly disabling medical problems. I have been meeting with them, both here in Washington, and back in my home State of Michigan. It is hard to describe fully the magnitude of this problem without addressing individual cases and actually having them give first-person accounts as to both what happened to them when they were over in the war zone and also what has happened to them since they have returned.

Back on September 9, here on the Senate floor, I released a lengthy report which suggested that the illnesses which have come to be called gulf war syndrome - a collection of illnesses, serious illnesses, that our veterans are experiencing - could have resulted from exposure to chemical and biological warfare agents in the war zone, either through direct exposure from some kind of weapon, or shellfire; or from the downwind exposure as we bombed these biological and chemical weapons facilities - throwing hazardous debris up into the air which was then carried down over our troops.

There is also a question as to whether some of the medicines that we gave our troops to protect them against exposures of this kind may also have had the result of making some of them sick.

?Anthrax was shipped from the United States to Iraq back on May 2, 1986, and again in September 1988 - signed, sealed, delivered, and approved by our own Government, our own Department of Commerce.?

In any event, the symptoms associated with what is called gulf war syndrome are very debilitating and, in fact, have already killed too many of our returning veterans. The symptoms include muscle and joint pain, serious memory loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, runny noses, urinary and intestinal tract problems, twitching, rashes, sores, and emotional and temper problems. There is a whole long list. These are the kinds of things that our research reveals could very readily be caused by exposures to chemical or biological weapons agents.

We started our inquiry by looking at chemical weapons because, after the war was over, the U.N. inspectors found huge stockpiles of chemical weapons held by Saddam Hussein. We also knew that in previous war encounters with the Kurds and the Iranians, they had used chemical weapons and that they had a very advanced capability in that area.

When the U.N. inspectors went in, they found thousands of chemical weapons shells. During the war itself, and this is based on a large number of first-hand accounts by veterans from Michigan and around the country who were in the gulf, that shells exploded, chemical alarms went off and they were told to put on their chemical protective gear. Many got sick at the time. Many remained sick after coming back to the United States.

In one very graphic instance, a Marine officer was running the most sophisticated mechanical chemical detection device deployed in the battle area. A chemical alarm went off and he got a computer reading as to what chemical agents were present in the area in which he was patrolling. It was recorded on a computer tape. He called into his headquarters and they asked him to send it in. He gave it to a courier and, of course, the tape has disappeared and has not been seen since. We do know this happened, and he has so testified before the U.S. Senate.  [The tape may have been confiscated to cover up US involvement in Iraq’s acquisition and use of chemical weapons.]

[snip]

After we finally got the information from the Commerce Department, we then contacted a principal supplier of these materials to determine exactly what materials were exported to Iraq which could have contributed to their biological weapons capability.

The records which we were able to get from the supplier were for the period since 1985. We were not able to get any records prior to 1985.  But let me tell you what we have now learned about exports since 1985.

We found that pathogenic, which means disease-producing items, and toxigenic, meaning poisonous items, and other hazardous materials were exported from the United States to Iraq following a licensing and application procedure actually set forth by our own United States Department of Commerce.

That meant our own Government had to approve the shipment of these materials and obviously did so - approving the shipment of these items to Iraq before the war started.

Now, we further learned by talking to the suppliers that these exported biological materials were not weakened when they were shipped over there. In other words, many were full pathogens capable of being reproduced by Iraq once they got there. Between the years of 1985 and 1989, the United States Government approved the sales of quantities of potentially lethal biological agents that could have been cultured and grown in very large quantities in an Iraqi biological warfare program.

[snip]

Let us talk about in detail about what we sent Saddam Hussein and his government before the war to help them develop that very capability.

The U.N. inspectors after the war found four facilities that had been involved in biological warfare-related research, but interestingly the inspectors were kept out of those plants for a full year and a half after the war was over - obviously, so they could be cleaned up - so the evidence would be gone by the time the inspectors got in there. [Again to hide evidence that could be traced back to US exports of chemical weapons?]   So when they finally got in there a year and a half later, they could find no evidence of biological weapons production, but they did confirm that at least one of these facilities could produce up to 50 gallons of biological agents each week, and, of course, the Defense Department report which I just cited makes it clear that we knew they were doing exactly that.

I think the U.S. Government approving export of these materials to a government like that and to someone like Saddam Hussein violates every standard of logic and common sense. But that is what happened.  Now, included in these Government-approved sales are the following biological materials which have been considered by various nations for use in war with their associated disease symptoms. Let me spell them out, and these are medical terms, but it is important they be on the record - so the people know it, and so researchers can compare the illnesses we are now seeing with the effects of exposure to these particular items.

The first one is bacillus anthracis, or anthrax as it is called, which is a disease-producing bacteria identified by the Department of Defense in ‘The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress,‘ as being a major component in the Iraqi biological warfare program.

Anthrax is an often-fatal infectious disease caused by ingestion of anthrax spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing, and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia, or blood poisoning, and the mortality is high. Once it is advanced, antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins remain, despite the death of the bacteria itself. Next is clostridium botulinum, a bacterial source of botulinum toxin, which causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache, fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils, paralysis of the muscles involving swallowing, and is often fatal.

The next one is histoplasma capsulatum which causes a disease that superficially resembles tuberculosis but may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and spleen, anemia, or an influenza-like illness and acute inflammatory skin disease marked by tender red nodules, usually on the shins. Interestingly, many of the veterans coming back have these kinds of symptoms and the acute skin inflammation is very common. Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.

Brucella melitensis is a bacteria which can cause chronic fatigue, loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest - this is another common symptom - all of these the veterans will tell you they are dealing with these symptoms. Other symptoms include pain in joints and muscles, insomnia, nausea, and can result in damage to major organs.

Clostridium perfringens is a highly toxic bacteria which causes gas gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause a systemic illness.

Now, I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of any distribution of these kinds of items and the possible exposure of our people to these kinds of toxins in some weapons form.

I wish to just show on the chart when these things were sent over to Iraq. I have listed each one that I just cited here in these blue boxes.

 

Anthrax was shipped from the United States to Iraq back on May 2, 1986, and again in September 1988 - signed, sealed, delivered, and approved by our own Government, our own Department of Commerce.

Clostridium botulinum was shipped on May 22, 1986, and again in September 1988 from the United States to Iraq. Histoplasma capsulatum was shipped in February 1985 and went to the Ministry of Higher Education, so-called, in Iraq.

Clostridium perfringens was shipped in May 1986 and again in September 1988.

In addition, several shipments of E. Coli and genetic materials, human and bacterial DNA, were shipped directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

 

Listing of Biological Materials Exported to Iraq from US

The following is detailed listing of biological materials, provided by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issuance of an export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department:

Materials Shipped:

Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup

Materials Shipped:

Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136)

Class III pathogen

Materials Shipped:

Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136)

Class III pathogen

Materials Shipped:

Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10)

Batch ) 08-20-82 (2 each)

Class III pathogen.

 

Bacillus Subtilis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82)

Batch ) 06-20-84 (2 each)

 

Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502)

Batch) 07-07-81 (3 each)

Class III Pathogen

 

Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et al (ATCC 3624) Batch) 10-85SV (2 each)

Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051) Batch) 12-06-84 (2 each)

Francisella tularensis var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC 6223) Batch) 05-14-79 (2 each) Avirulent, suitable for preparations of diagnostic antigens.

Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441)

Batch) 03-84 (3 each) Highly toxigenic.

 

Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564) Batch) 03-02-79 (2 each)

Class III pathogen

Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779) Batch) 04-24-84S (3 each)

Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916) Batch) 08-14-80 (2 each)

Agglutinating type 2.

Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124)

Batch) 07-84SV (3 each)

Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lecithinase C.J. Appl.

 

Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185)

Batch) 01-14-80 (3 each)

G.G. Wright (Fort Detrick) V770-NP1-R. Bovine anthrax,

Class III pathogen

 

Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578)

Batch) 01-06-78 (2 each)

Class III pathogen.

 

Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581)

Batch) 04-18-85 (2 each)

 

Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945)

Batch) 06-21-81 (2 each)

 

Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855)

Batch) 06-21-71

Class III pathogen.

 

Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213)

Batch) 3-84 (2 each)

 

Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397)

Batch) 08-18-81 (2 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450)

Batch) 08-02-84 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455)

Batch) 02-05-68 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456)

Batch) 03-08-78 (2 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458)

Batch) 01-29-68 (2 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763)

Batch) 8-83 (2 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415)

Batch) 02-02-84 (2 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Materials Shipped:

Saccharomyces cerevesiae (ATCC 2601)

Batch) 08-28-08 (1 each)

 

Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype typhi (ATCC 6539) Batch) 06-86S (1 each)

Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633)

Batch) 10-85 (2 each)

 

Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031)

Batch) 08-13-80 (1 each)

Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536)

Batch) 04-09-80 (1 each)

 

Bacillus cereus (11778)

Batch) 05-85SV (2 each)

 

Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228)

Batch) 11-86s (1 each)

 

Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884)

Batch) 09-08-80 (2 each)

 

Materials Shipped:

Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303)

Batch) 04-87S

Phage host

 

Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC45031)

Batch) 06-14-85

Plant virus

 

Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC37349)

(Ti plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in E.

Coli) Batch) 05-28-85

Materials Shipped:

Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1 (ATCC 57236)

Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli

Hulambda14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57240)

Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli

Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1 (ATCC 57242)

Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli

Materials Shipped:

Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846)

Batch) 07-29-83 (1 each)

 

Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694)

Batch) 05-87 (1 each)

 

Materials Shipped:

Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240)

Batch)05-14-63 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938)

Batch)1963 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629)

Batch)10-23-85 (3 each)

 

Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009)

Batch)03-30-84 (3 each)

 

Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705)

Batch) 06-27-62 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014)

Batch) 05-11-66 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388)

Batch) 06-01-73 (3 each)

 

Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966)

Batch) 05-05-70 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Clostridium botulinum Type A

Batch) 07-86 (3 each)

Class III pathogen

 

Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018)

Batch) 04-83 (3 each)

 

Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019)

Batch) 03-88 (3 each)

 

Materials Shipped:

PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1 (ATCC 57057)

plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase pseudogene (HPRT) Chromosome(s): 5 p14-p13 (ATCC 57212)

Materials Shipped:

Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT)

Chromosome(s) X q26.1 (ATCC 57237) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli

Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT)

Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57240) Cloned from human lymphoblast Phage

vector; Suggested host: E.coli

Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT)

Chromosome(s) X q26.1 (ATCC 57241) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli

 

ARTICLE THREE

Bush Senior: Hating Saddam, Selling Him Weapons

Kurt Nimmo, AlterNet

September 23, 2002

 

In an interview with CNN’s Paula Zahn, former president George Bush spoke recently of his “hatred” of Saddam Hussein. “I hate Saddam Hussein,” said Bush.”I don’t hate a lot of people. I don’t hate easily, but I think he’s, as I say, his word is no good and he’s a brute. He’s used poison gas on his own people. So, there’s nothing redeeming about this man.”

The former president claims to hate Saddam simply because he is “no good” and a “brute.” Zahn does not bother to probe deeper. Paula Zahn’s ratings are dismal these days. Her former boss over at FOX News said, “a dead raccoon could get higher ratings.” The Bush interview, obviously, is good for Zahn’s floundering career. As such, we shouldn’t expect Zahn to push Bush Senior on the particulars of his hatred. Not these days, anyway, when the corporate media essentially plays second fiddle for the government.

[snip]

It is fair to conclude Bush has not always hated Saddam. Or if he has

hated Saddam all these years, he put that hatred aside in the name of statecraft.  Reagan, Bush, the Iraqi dictator, and American corporations have worked together over the years.  War and death make for good business.  It also makes for lies and deception—and possibly for less than truthful interviews.

Former Reagan official and National Security Council staffer Howard Teicher has described a less than hateful relationship between the Reagan administration and Saddam Hussein.  In 1995, Teicher offered an affidavit in the Teledyne case, a legal sideshow to a larger scandal known as “Iraqgate.” According to Teicher, he and Donald Rumsfeld traveled to Iraq to make sure the Iraqi dictator received what he needed in order to win the Iran-Iraq war—or if not win at least make sure there was a draw. “CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles,” Teicher swore in the affidavit.

Teicher claims the United States “actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing US military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq had the military weaponry required.”

Reagan also sent a secret message to Saddam, which then vice president Bush delivered to Egyptian President Mubarak, and Mubarak passed on to Saddam, “telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran.”  Reagan CIA director Casey wanted to give Saddam cluster bombs, which “were a perfect ‘force multiplier’ that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the ‘human waves’ of Iranian attackers,” explained the former NSC staffer. He recorded Casey’s comments in meeting minutes, which are now in the Ronald Reagan presidential archives in Simi Valley, California.

In 1982, Reagan “legalized” direct military assistance to Iraq.  This resulted in more than a billion dollars in military related exports.  According to Kenneth R. Timmerman (author of The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq) the US government under Reagan and Bush sold Iraq 60 Hughes MD 500 “Defender” helicopters, eight Bell Textron AB 212 military helicopters equipped for anti-submarine warfare, 48 Bell Textron 214 ST utility helicopters (sold for “recreational” purposes), and US military infra-red sensors and thermal imaging scanners (sold illegally to Iraq through a Dutch company). After the Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency found the following US equipment in Iraq: spectrometers, oscilloscopes, neutron initiators, high-speed switches for nuclear detonation, and other tools used to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons.

“One entire facility, a tungsten-carbide manufacturing plant that was part of the Al Atheer complex,” Timmerman told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “was blown up by the IAEA in April 1992 because it lay at the heart of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program, PC-3. Equipment for this plant appears to have been supplied by the Latrobe, Pennsylvania manufacturer, Kennametal, and by a large number of other American companies, with financing provided by the Atlanta branch of the BNL bank.”

BNL—or Banca Nazionale del Lavoro—provided more than $5 billion in

unauthorized loans to Iraq, including $900 million guaranteed by the US

government. “About half of the money allegedly went to finance the

purchase of US farm products, including $900 million guaranteed by the

Agriculture Department’s Commodity Credit Corp., but investigators said

much of the rest had helped fuel Iraq’s military buildup,” wrote George

Lardner in the Washington Post on 22 March 1992.  Lardner and others

were learning about covert and illegal arms sales to Iraq through

Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, chairman of the House Banking

Committee. Gonzalez was conducting “special orders”—uninterrupted

speeches on the House floor—detailing the criminal behavior of Reagan

and Bush. Hardly anybody paid attention, least of all Bush, who was running for a second term.

While Bush Junior declares he “will not allow... a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction,” the administration of his father and Reagan, as the Gonzalez revelations demonstrate, apparently didn’t have the future of America in mind when they allowed biological and chemical weapons—as well as massive amounts of conventional military hardware—to be exported to Iraq.  They were only interested in making sure Saddam gassed as many Iranians as possible—and thus pay back the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini for evicting the despised Shah Reza Pahlavi and initiating an anti-western revolution in Iran. No doubt it irks Bush, Cheney, neocons in general, and a few mulitnaitonal oil corporations that Iran is calling the shots on its oil resources.

The US Department of Commerce licensed 70 biological exports to Iraq between 1985 and 1989, including at least 21 batches of lethal strains of anthrax. The French newspaper Le Figaro, in an article published in 1998, said researchers at the Rockville, Maryland lab of the American Type Culture Collection confirmed sending anthrax samples via mail order to Iraq. After the Gulf War, Iraq made several declarations to UN weapons inspectors about how they had weaponized the anthrax sent to them by the American corporation. In 1985, the US Centers of Disease Control sent samples of an Israeli strain of West Nile virus to a microbiologist at the Basra University in Iraq. In addition, Iraq received other “various toxins and bacteria,” including botulins and E.  coli.

Corporations that have sold dual-use chemicals and biological samples to Iraq for its weapons program include: Phillips Petroleum, Unilever, Alcolac, Allied Signal, the American Type Culture Collection, and Teledyne. Teledyne pled guilty to charges of criminal conspiracy, false statements, and violations of the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act for indirectly exporting 130 tons of zirconium to Iraq through Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Cardoen. The zirconium was intended for use in cluster bombs. In defense, Teledyne argued during the trial that the CIA had authorized the shipments. [Recall above that CIA Director Casey wanted to give Iraq cluster bombs]  The Baltimore company Alcolac was convicted of illegally selling thiodiglycol—a chemical precursor used in the production of mustard gas—for use in Iraq’s chemical warfare program.

When Murray Waas and Craig Unger published an article in The New Yorker about the Reagan administration and Bush’s involvement with Saddam Hussein—a full three years before Howard Teicher’s revelatory affidavit—they were roundly condemned and mocked by the corporate media. Steven Emerson of the Wall Street Journal called the article a “Byzantine conspiracy theory,” while Michael Fumento, a syndicated columnist, said the story was “a big fat nothing,” baseless innuendo that “spread like a flesh-eating bacteria into newspapers, newsmagazines, and television news throughout the country.” Others accused a liberal media of attempting to derail Bush’s re-election bid.

During the election, Bill Clinton promised, if elected, he would appoint an independent prosecutor to investigate the Iraqgate scandal. But like so many election promises Iraqgate fell off the radar screen not long after Clinton assumed office. Worse, when former NSC staffer Howard Teicher presented his affidavit in 1995, the Clinton Justice Department went on the offensive, accused Teicher of lying, and then promptly classified the document as a state secret. On January 15, 1995, attorney general Janet Reno and deputy John Hogan released a Final Report whitewashing the entire affair. It was hoped the whole thing would simply fade away. Except for a few books and other “Byzantine conspiracy theories,” the Reagan-Bush-Iraqgate scandal has pretty much slipped from public view.

In general, the corporate media gave but cursory notice to the revelations. “There’s a good reason why we in the media are so partial to a nice, torrid sex scandal,” said Ted Koppel, as he opened a Nightline Iraqgate report in 1992. “It is, among other things, so easy to explain and so easy to understand. Nothing at all, in other words, like allegations of a government cover-up, which tend to be not at all easy to explain, and even more difficult to understand.” In short, according to Koppel and the corporate media, the American people do not have the intelligence to judge for themselves if their leaders are criminals. Obviously, Monica Lewinsky is more important.

As Dubya the Junior and his coterie of chick hawks prepare to make war on a Frankenstein Bush the Senior—at least in part—created, the revelations exposed by Representative Henry B. Gonzalez and a handful of others need to be revisited within the full context of public debate.

However, considering the handmaiden role of corporate media in the dissemination of government propaganda—and its insistence upon offering vacuous interviews by the likes of Paula Zahn—chances are the American people will not be allowed to understand any time soon what the government does in their name.

Our only hope, it would seem, rests in “Byzantine conspiracy theories.”

Kurt Nimmo is a photographer and multimedia developer in Las Cruces, New Mexico. He can be reached at: nimmo@zianet.com. 

 

Elson Boles

Assistant Professor

Dept. of Sociology

Saginaw Valley State University

University Center

Saginaw MI, 48710